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at	 certain	 times	 of	 the	 year.	 Given	 that	 trucking	 is	 deregulated,	 the	 latter	 finding	 is	 somewhat	
unexpected.	We	 suspect	 that	 this	 set	 of	 conditions	 very	 likely	 affects	 trucking	 rates	 across	more	
markets	and	regions	than	the	one	examined	here.  
INTRODUCTION
Inefficiencies in freight transportation can seriously affect industry competitiveness in today’s 
globalized marketplace. Trucking is the most important freight mode with respect to value 
transported, both worldwide and within North America. Canada, with its vast geography and 
dispersed population, is more economically dependent upon efficient transportation systems, 
including trucking, than many other industrialized nations.
The trucking industry was first regulated in Canada in the 1940s as a result of pressure to 
protect the rail industry from this relatively new form of competition. Changes in the political and 
regulatory atmosphere led to substantial deregulation of the Canadian trucking industry throughout 
the 1980s (Woudsma et al. 1996). For example, in 2004, trucking represented just under one third of 
all transportation activity, employed 168,000 people, and contributed $14.8 billion to the economy 
(Statistics Canada 2004).
A survey of studies prepared at various times for the government of Saskatchewan reveals the 
importance of for-hire grain trucking, particularly in the agri-processing sector. In 1998, grain hauls 
by truck in the province were 17 times greater than in the 1970s on a tonne-kilometer basis (Ray 
Barton Associates 1998). Furthermore, hauls to processing facilities represented 1.4 billion tonne-
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kilometers of traffic, which is twice the level of traffic moving from farms to primary elevators. 
This study also found that grain deliveries peak in September and October, while reaching a low in 
April and May. Extended to all of Western Canada, grain movement to processors comprises about 
6 billion tonne-kilometers (Trimac Consulting Services Ltd. 1999).
In Western Canada, agriculture is highly dependent on trucking for the movement of grain. 
Today, virtually all prairie grain is hauled via truck from the farmgate to the elevator or processor 
before entering the domestic or export supply chain. However, there have been surprisingly few 
published studies of market structure in Canadian trucking since deregulation. Furthermore, in spite 
of what appears to be a generally successful deregulation transition in Canadian trucking, there is 
continued anecdotal evidence from this sector that the level of trucking competition (as reflected 
in rates and service) varies noticeably across time and space. Evaluating the level and structure of 
competition in this sector is important because a less than competitive trucking industry ultimately 
leads to higher transportation costs for farmers, lowering profits in an industry that often operates 
on tight margins. 
To address these issues, we collected trucking rate data in order to evaluate the dynamics of 
transportation market structure within a region where one of the primary industries is grain handling 
and transportation. A set of free-on-board grain trucking rate records for a canola processor located 
in Lloydminster, Alberta, was assembled, creating a panel of trucking rates charged to farmers for 
canola delivery to Lloydminster from the numerous origins (farms) in the region. To illustrate some 
of the unique aspects of the data and analysis, we begin by using geographic information systems 
(GIS) software to develop visible freight rate contours for this transportation market through space. 
We first discuss how these contours should look under varying market structures, and then examine 
in detail a set of the generated contour maps for indications of uncompetitive pricing. Subsequently, 
we use a detailed subset of the data to perform an econometric estimation of short-run rate dynamics 
in this trucking market, using impulse response analysis to assess evidence about the degree and 
scope of competition in this market. After interpreting and comparing the results of these approaches 
for the measurement of market power in transportation, a final section concludes. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Trucking in North America and Canada
Throughout much of the 20th century, the trucking industry in North America was regulated over 
prices, entry, and service. One common argument historically used in support of trucking regulation 
was that without government regulation, shippers located in rural areas would face higher rates and 
reduced service. An excellent review of the theory and history of trucking regulations in the United 
States and Canada can be found in Sloss (1970). Sloss also examines the historical differences 
between the trucking industry in the province of Alberta, which was generally not regulated, and 
that of the province of Saskatchewan, which was highly regulated up to the more recent era of 
deregulation.
With deregulation of the competing freight rail sector, the for-hire trucking sector was finally 
deregulated in both the U.S. and Canada through the 1980s (Viscusi et al. 1996; Bonsor 1995). 
In fact, there exists a considerable empirical literature about the U.S. experience with trucking 
deregulation. Most of this research indicates that deregulation was responsible for improved safety, 
greater efficiency, and lowered rates in the United States (Beilock and Freeman 1987; Carlton and 
Perloff 2005). 
With respect to agricultural transportation, research on the grain elevator industry in the U.S. 
has evaluated the transportation characteristics of elevators in the Great Plains Region (Vachal and 
Tolliver 2001). Their survey of elevator managers examined their perceptions of grain trucking 
availability during harvest and non-harvest periods, as well as overall competition within the trucking 
93
JTRF Volume 52 No. 3, Fall 2013
industry. Rates were also surveyed for harvest and non-harvest periods, for distances of 50, 100, 
and 200 miles (80, 160, and 320 kilometers, respectively). They found that rates increased during 
harvest and decreased per loaded mile as distance increased. So for certain U.S. grain producing 
regions, evidence exists of seasonality in grain trucking rates. 
One of the few Canadian-based studies that analyzed the effects of trucking deregulation was 
that of Woudsma and Kanaroglou (1996). Utilizing a mix of data from Statistics Canada, the authors 
analyzed a set of commodity groups and traffic corridors in the Ontario trucking market to determine 
if freight rates and service levels were consistent among urban and non-urban routes. They found no 
significant change in rate setting or service provision following deregulation. 
Woudsma and Kanaroglou (1996) offered two possible interpretations for their unexpected 
results. The first possibility was that Canadian regulation was so ineffective that the removal of 
these regulations did not result in any significant changes to the business environment. The second 
interpretation was that the effects of deregulation within the trucking industry are inherently 
difficult to assess using aggregated data, since each corridor and commodity has its own unique 
characteristics. In fact, evidence for the latter was observed in the measured effects of deregulation 
in the Ontario provincial trucking market, where they found some commodities that were affected 
positively, some negatively, and some not at all by deregulation. Our research differs from their 
work because this analysis uses disaggregated rate data on just a single commodity moving from 
multiple origins to one destination. In addition, our rate data have been collected directly from the 
shipper and thus are less likely to contain any measurement bias.
Empirical Studies of Market Structure in Transportation Industries
De Vany and Walls (1996) proposed in their research that spatial arbitrage will affect goods prices 
only if there exists a flow of goods between the spatial markets. In unregulated markets, these 
opportunities will be exploited until delivered prices are equalized across markets and supranormal 
profit is dissipated – this is the classic law of one price. However, if there is no link between 
dispersed markets, or the flow between the two markets is restricted, then De Vany and Walls (1996) 
offer that goods prices will no longer be bound by these arbitrage limits and that opportunities for 
supranormal profit will persist.
In their work on the U.S. natural gas market, De Vany and Walls (1996) found that if their 
test of the law of one price failed, it occurred either because there were no physical links between 
markets allowing for product to flow, or there were capacity/flow constraints. Applying impulse 
response analysis with their time series model, they showed that when the law of one price holds, 
any variation in spot prices was dampened very quickly. In related work, De Vany and Walls (1999) 
again applied their empirical time series arbitrage framework, this time to deregulated electricity 
markets. The latter study also contains a discussion of seasonality issues in electricity markets. They 
conclude that during off-peak periods, price shocks can be absorbed in the local market, without 
much effect on other markets. However, during peak periods, the local market is less able to handle 
price shocks, and the effects ripple through the connecting markets.
Finally, Miljkovic (2001) examined pricing practices of U.S. railways by constructing an 
econometric model measuring freight rate convergence between regions. He tested the possibility 
that markets might exhibit partial adjustment (incomplete convergence) when some degree of 
market imperfection, such as a transportation monopoly, exists in that market. When freight rates 
were found to converge across regions, Miljkovic (2001) suggested that this occurred because many 
movements in his data set had access to competing forms of transportation, including trucking and 
river barges. In those cases when freight rates did not converge, he argued that this was likely due 
to an origin being served by a monopoly transportation provider (a railway). In the econometric 
portion of this research, we will use a similar specification as these authors, which will allow us to 
assess the speed at which freight rate shocks dissipate in various markets. 
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EVALUATING SPATIAL MARKET POWER AND DYNAMICS IN TRANSPORTATION
In the study of competitive markets, one of the traditional prerequisites for the existence of a 
perfectly competitive industry is that markets are somehow localized, with considerations of space 
usually subsumed in assumptions about equivalent delivered pricing, which in itself helps define the 
relevant market for analysis (Viscusi et al. 1996). With respect to transportation industries, it is clear 
that the element of space is a crucial factor in market structure. This reality renders it more difficult 
to identify and understand market structure in transportation markets in a traditional sense.
Since trucking route and pricing restrictions in Canada were lifted under deregulation, we would 
expect, ceteris	 paribus, that few constrained transportation flows should remain between these 
regional trucking markets. In effect, trucking firms will respond to price signals by moving excess 
service capacity to those markets where there are profits to be earned. This reallocation of resources 
in a competitive market should eventually generate a single transportation price for a comparable 
service (e.g., commodity, location, etc.). Alternatively, when transportation flows are constrained or 
restricted, such as when supply tightens during the peak-load grain movement period at harvest, we 
expect that transportation rates should rise due to a decrease in competitive pressure. However, in a 
deregulated market, trucking rates should eventually return to arbitrage-free equilibrium when these 
restrictions disappear. And during other times, if an abnormally high rate is observed for a particular 
origin/destination pairing over an extended period, it is highly likely to be an indication of reduced 
transportation competition in that market.
For these shippers and this market, considering off-peak periods such as the period before grain 
harvest, regional, and local trucking companies should be able to manage any transitory changes in 
transportation demand. In this case, rates may fluctuate briefly in certain markets, but these changes 
should not affect other origin/destination pairings to a significant degree. However, during peak 
movement periods, the local trucking market may not have enough capacity to meet increased 
demand. Therefore, not only will freight rates rise in the local market, but supply will likely be 
drawn in from other markets, reducing available supply, and increasing rates in those markets as 
well.
Rate Structures and Spatial Context - Iso-rate Contours1
To examine the nature and structure of competition in this regional trucking market, we begin by 
developing a spatial representation of the rate data. In effect, we generate a set of iso-rate, or “same-
rate,” contours for the trucking market using ArcInfo GIS software. As we shall see below, these 
contours can reveal interesting spatial patterns in the base freight rate data.2 All iso-rates created for 
this study are centered on the single destination or delivery point for all freight traffic in the data set 
(the town of Lloydminster, Alberta). 
With reference to the importance of space in transportation, the following interpretation is 
offered concerning the shape and relative smoothness of these transportation iso-rate contours (see 
Figure 1). In a competitive transportation market, transportation rates should depend mostly on cost. 
And since transportation cost is in most cases proportional to distance, it should be the case that 
competitive freight rates vary in proportion to changes in the distance between origin and destination 
in that transportation market. Therefore, all else being equal, freight rates set competitively should 
increase (decrease) equi-proportionately as distance increases (decreases) relative to a common 
origin or destination (i.e., the market). Regarding a mapping of rate contours, this means that a 
competitive transportation market should generate relatively smooth and symmetric iso-rate level 
curves with minimal distortions in the contour. Examples of this are shown with the hypothetical 
iso-rate contour representations A and B in Figure 1, each measured relative to the central origin/
destination (represented by the small triangle in the figure).
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Allowing for the fact that the exact shape of iso-rates in a particular transportation market 
can also depend on specific geographic factors, such as the existence of impassable barriers (i.e. 
rivers and lakes) and the physical design of the transportation network, all else being equal, iso-rate 
curves generated within a competitive transportation market should approximate a smooth circular 
or elliptical shape. Given this supposition about the shape of competitive iso-rates, we suggest that 
the converse can also be the case - that marked distortions or irregularities in mapped freight rate 
contours that are not readily attributable to any obvious physical or geographic factors affecting 
route choice may instead be attributable to varying levels of competition through the transportation 
market at that point in time. The latter situation is shown using the stretched or distorted iso-rate C in 
Figure 1. Using the assumptions, the identical rate paid at the closer physical location to the origin/
destination (point C1) compared with the more distant point C2 would be attributable to relatively 
less competition in the vicinity of point C1.
 
Rate Dynamics Through Time and Space – Vector Autoregression
This regional trucking market is multi-faceted. Rates may depend not only on market structure, 
but also on long-term relationships, time, and capacity. In fact, rate setting in the sector may give 
rise to relationships that mask collusive and/or monopolistic behavior on the part of trucking 
firms. Given this, we will supplement the spatial mapping analysis with econometric estimates and 
impulse response analysis using a subset of the same data to identify the structure of rate dynamics 
associated with a set of origins (De Vany and Walls 1996). A series of vector autoregressions on 
trucking rates will be estimated between pairs of some key origins in the sample. Specifically, the 
econometric pair-wise relationships estimated have the following structure (for the analysis, all data 
were transformed using logarithms):
  
Here, p(a,t) is the trucking rate from origin A to destination at time T, DI is the diesel price 
















the analysis are listed in Table 2 and Appendix E). The reason to include a diesel price index (see 
Appendix B) and the wage rate in the estimates is that these two factors alone comprise between 
48% to 60% of the total operating cost for commercial trucks (Trimac Consulting Services Ltd. 
2001; Bulk Plus Logistics 2002; Bulk Plus Logistics 2003; Logistics Solution Builders Inc. 2005). 
Since rates are almost certainly affected by significant cost variation no matter what the structure 
of the market, these variables need to be included in a study of rate movements at the market level. 
Inclusion of these exogenous variables also prevents freight rate variance from being falsely 
attributed to variation at the other origin. Furthermore, lag structures in the variables are used to 
capture time adjustments to rates, since the rate setting process along each route at each location 
may not adjust immediately to changes in variable trucking costs.3 We also selected two period lags 
in the exogenous variables, since it is the understanding of the authors that trucking firms in this 
sector typically do not adjust prices immediately in the very short term because of expected future 
price changes. However, we postulate that in a typical competitive operating environment, it is 
highly unlikely delays in rate adjustment longer than two time periods (two months in our sample) 
would be observed.
Subsequently, impulse response functions (or IRFs) will be generated using simulated (price) 
impulses or shocks for each equation pair. As a well-established graphical diagnostic technique 
used in VAR modeling to examine system dynamics, Schmidt (2004) offers an excellent description 
of impulse response estimation and interpretation. The reason we will generate IRF’s in this 
situation is that related research in other industries has argued that due to arbitrage across markets, 
competitive freight rate setting processes should necessarily react to mitigate rate/price impulses 
or shocks relatively quickly. This means a competitive transportation market modeled with a VAR 
(and associated IRFs) on rates should completely dissipate a (simulated) rate shock/impulse within 
the short run, with the latter as defined by the data series (De Vany and Walls 1996; Wilson and 
Thoma 2007). Conversely, a less competitive freight rate setting will not dissipate a simulated rate 
shock as quickly. In the latter case, rate adjustments must be occurring in relative isolation from 
other markets, thus slowing or limiting the possibility of competitive price arbitrage to dissipate any 
supernormal profits from the rate shock.
DATA
The data used in this study were provided by a canola processor located in Lloydminster, Alberta. 
Sixty-eight months of transportation rate data were compiled from January 2001 to August 2006. In 
the analysis, the monthly rates used are averaged over that month. The data include month and year 
of delivery, origin, as well as the rate paid to the trucking firm for the movement. Freight rates are 
listed as Canadian dollars per metric tonne, and observations are all based on a common convention 
of 40 net metric tonnes of canola seed delivered per truck movement. While the common destination 
or delivery point is Lloydminster (see the detail map in Appendix A), those origins from where the 
product is delivered to Lloydminster are found across the expanse of East-Central Alberta to West-
Central Saskatchewan.
Once assembled, a small percentage of observations were discarded, mostly due to odd sized 
loads or trucking rates that were flat rates. Additional supplementary data relating to costs were 
obtained from Statistics Canada (2006a, 2006b), including the retail diesel price index for the Prairie 
region, as well as the average weekly wage rate for transport and equipment operators in Alberta 
and Saskatchewan. 
The data had to be organized in two ways. To more readily construct the maps or contours of the 
trucking rates around the single delivery point, the data were aggregated into quarters. Ultimately, 
only “spring” and “fall” (harvest) periods were mapped for this study, and industry realities (to 
be discussed in detail later) suggest these quarters would be most likely to show evidence of any 
non-competitive pricing practices. Table 1 lists the number of origins present in each period for the 
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various iso-rate maps. With respect to the overall shape of the iso-rate maps, it is worth noting that 
another interesting aspect of this study is that the region possesses a very dense rural road network, 
typically offering several possible routings for many of the movements contained in the data set. 
In fact, the province of Saskatchewan has the highest road density per capita of any jurisdiction in 
North America (Barry et al. 1999). And while the quality of the road varies in Saskatchewan, the 
route choices for grain movement remain surprisingly numerous. 
Table 1: Number of Locations by Season Used in








* For clarity, these iso-rate maps were omitted from this analysis. However, all the iso-rate maps are available 
upon request from the authors. 
To assemble appropriate data for the examination of rate dynamics in this industry and region, 
some data issues had to be addressed. We note that while there were 10,059 individual observations 
in the full data set (a basic summary of the complete data set is in Appendix C) associated with 
more than 30 origins, only seven origins were ultimately chosen for the econometric portion of the 
analysis because they yielded by far the most consistent rate data through the entire sample. Four 
of these seven origins are actually aggregates of two or three proximate origins in the original data, 
but this helps maintain the overall continuity of this data set. The names of the origins used in the 
econometric analysis of rate dynamics are listed in Table 2. In total, the chosen origins generated 
3,723 observations, or 37% of the total rate data. 

















Wetaskiwin (Weta) AB 266/165 Farms W/SW 508 57
Biggar/Perdue/Asquith 
(Big) SK 250/155 Farms E/SE 390 49
Hamlin/North Battleford 
(Ham) SK 151/96 Elevator E 553 48
Allan (All) SK 337/209 Elevator E/SE 371 43
Radisson/Borden (Rad) SK 210/130 Farms E 172 39
Prince Albert/Birch Hills 
(PA) SK 348/216 Farms E/NE 185 38
Unity (Uni) SK 164/102 Elevator SE 1,544 37
But as shown in Table 2, none of the selected origins generated consistent observations through 
the full sample period. For instance, while Unity, SK generated 15% of the total data set, Unity rate 
data was observed in only 37 of the 68 sample months. So in order to construct a proper temporal 
data set for comparative analysis, non-coincident observations in time across these chosen origin 
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pairings were discarded, as well as any missing observations. The latter process reduced the data set 
for the econometric analysis considerably. As an example, while Wetaskiwin and Allan as origins 
(to Lloydminster) generated almost 900 rate observations between them in the 68 months of raw 
data (see Table 2), rates from Wetaskiwin to Lloydminster and Allan to Lloydminster were observed 
at the same point in time (i.e., the same month) on just 38 occasions in the data (see the first entry 
in Table 3). Ultimately, we identified a set of such trip pairings (pairs of origins) that generated a 
minimum of 25 concurrent observations over the sample. This left us with 16 possible trip pairings 
across the region to be examined in the econometric portion of the analysis (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Concurrent Observations for VAR Pairings (Origins to Lloydminster) 
  (Asterisk Indicates a Stable VAR Pairing)
Wetaskiwin Allan 38 Biggar Allan* 32
Biggar* 43 Hamlin* 41
Hamlin* 43 Prince Albert* 31
Prince Albert 33 Radisson 29
Radisson 33 Unity* 25
Unity 26
Allan Prince Albert 27
Hamlin Allan 37 Radisson 26
Prince Albert* 32
Radisson 29
EVALUATING THE SPATIAL NATURE OF TRUCKING RATES AND DYNAMICS 
THROUGH TIME
Iso-rate Maps
A set of representative rate contour maps are illustrated in Appendix D, Figures 2 to 7, and we also 
refer the reader to the detail map in Appendix A, highlighting the location of Lloydminster and the 
major highway in the region, Highway 16. Each iso-rate map effectively represents a snapshot of 
the prevailing trucking rates at that time for travel to the plant in Lloydminster. One element that 
stands out about the contour maps was the distortionary influence of the main highway running 
through the region. Provincial Highway 16 runs east-west through Lloydminster and connects the 
city to major population centers in both Alberta (Edmonton) and Saskatchewan (Saskatoon). Many 
of the illustrated contours appear to be formed into a stretched elliptical shape centered on the 
highway. Since Hwy 16 is the main feeder route for traffic moving east-west in the region, this 
finding is not entirely unexpected. In addition, the influence of Hwy 16 on the contours might also be 
attributed to the fact that while high in density, much of the regional rural road network (especially 
in Saskatchewan) was moving into disrepair around this time (Nolan 2003). This combined effect 
seems to really stretch some of the iso-rate contours along the highway within Saskatchewan (see 
Figures 2 and 3 for example). We conclude that that local road conditions in this sector at that time 
must have strongly affected routing decisions. 
Another interesting finding was that a number of the constructed iso-rate contours were not very 
smooth (round or elliptical), even accounting for the effects of Highway 16. As described earlier, a 
jagged contour implies that a trucking company operating from the more distant origin was paid the 
same rate as a trucking company moving the commodity from an origin closer to the destination, 
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even when both shipments were made at approximately the same time. Ceteris paribus, since the 
more distant location necessarily generates greater transportation costs, the closer carrier moving 
the commodity would seem to have been over-paid (i.e., operated in a less competitive market) 
relative to the more distant carrier. 
While of interest because this finding stands in some contrast to common perceptions about 
the trucking industry in general, in all cases identified in the contour data, conditions indicative 
of reduced transportation competition were not static and the mapped rate contours often changed 
markedly from one season to the next. As an example, when observing contours that would appear 
to indicate reduced transportation competition, such as the jagged and pointy set of contours through 
the eastern portion of Figure 4, if we examine the same contours one year later (Figure 5) they 
are much smoother by comparison, a result consistent with increasing competition over time. And 
conversely, we observe in Figure 6 that the iso-rates are generally smoother compared with those 
found in Figure 7 (again, the latter are observations from one year later), where the iso-rates are 
more jagged or irregular. 
Our observation that iso-rate roughness did not persist and was of relatively short duration in the 
sample accords with an observation by DeVany and Walls (1999) with respect to electricity markets, 
who found that periods experiencing capacity constraints were characterized by above normal rates. 
For grain trucking in this region, the iso-rates seem to show that most of the time and on aggregate 
trucking rates were set competitively, but there were certain times and places where less competitive 
rates could be identified, and in most cases only transitionally. Perhaps not surprisingly, the contour 
maps also show that the latter situation occurred more often in times where demand for trucking 
services and capacity (i.e., at harvest time) would likely come under the greatest strain. 
Rate Dynamics - Econometric Analysis4
Next, the dynamics of the 16 trucking rate origin pairings shown in Table 3 were examined in more 
detail using time series methods. Initial unit root testing on the data series within the origin pairs 
revealed that many of the series were non-stationary, so all the rate series were first differenced 
to achieve stationarity. Ultimately, seven data pairings stabilized for further analysis (see Table 2 
and Appendix F), and the set of coefficient estimates are listed in Appendix E.5 The VAR models 
estimated are labeled as Models 1 through 7, grouped in the table by common origins across the 
models as much as possible. 
Overall, the VAR estimates account for approximately 45% of variation within the various 
trucking rate time series. Harvest or “fall” as defined in the study was expected to generate the 
highest trucking rates compared to the other seasons, since the greatest volume of grain moves at 
harvest time in the region. We found that several of the dummy seasonality variables had negative 
coefficient estimates (with six of the seven models showing this effect), meaning that time periods 
other than harvest were generally characterized by comparatively lower rates. We also found that 
diesel prices (including lags in some cases) were significant in five of the seven models, while four 
of these significant coefficients were positive (the expected sign). Wages were also found to be 
significant in four of the seven models, but only one of these coefficients was positive (the expected 
sign). Finally, while we must be careful not to infer too much from the estimated price coefficients, 
they do offer insight about the structural dynamics within each estimated system (Schmidt 2004). 
Observe that while every model had at least one significant own-price coefficient, only three of the 
seven had significant cross price coefficients. Taken together, this implies that the level of market 
integration varied considerably among the chosen origin pairings.  
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Vector Autoregression Impulse Responses
Impulse response functions are simulated responses to one standard deviation shocks to each 
estimated equation in VAR model and are used to analyze the ability of the estimated system to absorb 
and dampen out rate “shocks’ over time. For the trucking rate VAR pairwise models estimated here, 
each impulse response graph is shown in Appendix F, Figures 8 to 14. Note that each graph shows 
the dampening process associated with each rate equation in the two equation systems, initiated 
through a simulated shock to the listed rate variable. With the exception of a single example (Figure 
12 – Biggar/Allan), none of the simulated system shocks dampen very quickly. In fact, the average 
duration from shock to dissipation in the origin parings is approximately six to seven months. 
As noted previously, relatively fast dampening of such impulses is expected within a competitive 
market. But leaving trucking competition considerations aside, there are other possible reasons for 
the extended shocks in these origin pairs. These include the restricted flow of information between 
trucking firms, as well as the actual rate setting process at the canola processor in Lloydminster. 
Since at the time there was no central market for truck freight in the region, obtaining rates from 
competing firms was not a simple process and involved significant transaction costs. If a certain 
trucking firm asked for a high or uncompetitive rate from a given origin, that information would be 
slow to disseminate to other trucking firms. Thus, any movement of market resources as a reaction 
via arbitrage would occur slowly, if at all. 
The actual rate setting process at this processing facility represents an interesting study in 
transaction costs and also confirms that mapped distortions in the iso-rate lines were attributable 
to varying levels of spatial competition in the trucking sector serving the canola processor.6 During 
the contracting process with sellers, the processor would offer to coordinate with trucking firms 
regarding on-farm pickup of the product as a convenience service. If this option was accepted, the 
trucking rate would be negotiated and set during this process, and was typically based on common 
expectations of the current market rate for truck freight. Once this contract was settled, the negotiated 
rate became a deduction from the final price paid to the farmer for the product. The trucking firm 
would be paid from this deduction, but it is important to note it was possible that the negotiated rate 
and actual rate paid were not the same. Of course, if the processor could find a trucking firm willing 
to transport the load for a lower rate than what was contracted initially, this would result in a net 
gain to the processor. However, incentives for the staff at the processor to try to find a lower trucking 
rate were not strong. This was because any profits obtained in this way were likely to be small in 
comparison with other possible non-transportation-related profit opportunities at the facility, while 
searching for lower truck freight rates had a high opportunity cost. 
There is also evidence of weak market integration and diminished trucking competition 
between certain origins in this sub-sample (see Appendix A map) of the trucking rate data. We note 
that figures 8 and 13 (both associated with a Prince Albert, SK, origin) show impulses that persist 
relatively longer as compared with others found in the sub-sample. While the city of Prince Albert 
is located approximately the same distance to Lloydminster as the town of Allan, Prince Albert is 
not on Highway 16, like Allan. Overall, the impulse responses indicate that Prince Albert is less 
connected to Lloydminster than Allan or any other of the Saskatchewan origins found in the sub-
sample (i.e., Unity and Biggar). 
In fact, the route to travel from Prince Albert to Lloydminster is more circuitous compared with 
the other locations identified in the VAR analysis. Such routing issues would also likely reduce the 
number of trucking companies who are willing to participate in this particular market. Combined 
with the observation of a lower overall traffic volume (Prince Albert had the second lowest number 
of observations in the sample), the impulse responses would seem to buttress the fact that there were 
simply fewer opportunities for market arbitrage in the Prince Albert-Lloydminster market, possibly 
because there were simply fewer trucking companies serving it. Although not conclusive, in light 
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of the persistent shocks present in the relevant impulse response functions, it seems that relatively 
less trucking competition was present in the Prince Albert to Lloydminster route during this time. 
On the other hand, evidence for competitive market structure in the other regional trucking 
markets can be seen by examining Figures 10, 12, and 14. In each of these market pairs, at least one 
of the locations generated rate shocks that converged to zero relatively fast. These responses to the 
price shocks indicate that the chosen pair of origins was well integrated in at least one direction, 
meaning that competition in the market was relatively strong. In fact, the impulse responses shown 
in Figure 12 indicate mutual market integration, with shocks that dissipate quickly in both directions. 
This result is likely due to the fact that both of these particular origins (Biggar/Allan) are relatively 
close together geographically, so that trucking from either origin uses the same routing. In addition, 
both of these origins are located close to a population center (Saskatoon), meaning that shipments 
from either could also be serviced by trucking firms located in Saskatoon, along with the regional 
trucking firms. Given this, it is not surprising that greater trucking competition in these areas was 
identified through the impulse responses, a finding in some contrast to some of the more remote 
origins in the region that would likely only be served by local trucking firms.
On its own, finding that no impulse responses generated through the trucking rates were 
dissipated very quickly (none of them dampen in less than five months) was somewhat surprising. 
In fact, many argue that the trucking industry is almost hyper-competitive, and that there are simply 
too many trucks on the road throughout North America (Belzer 2000). What is clear is that the 
trucking industry as a whole is extremely competitive, meaning that any arbitrage opportunities 
on rates should be everywhere quickly and fully dissipated down to purely competitive levels. But 
since the impulse responses generated within this trucking market took on average approximately 
six to seven months to dissipate, it seems that portions of this particular market were not always 
extremely competitive all the time, as is commonly assumed. 
In conjunction with the results from our iso-rate analysis, we identified variations in competition 
levels through space and time in what is considered by many without question to be a highly 
competitive industry at all times and in all places. Even considering the nature of the commodity 
market being served and other specific factors about the region, there were still instances and 
places where the de-regulated trucking market serving this region appeared to be considerably less 
competitive than expected. So while we conclude that perfect competition is still an appropriate 
economic paradigm to describe the broader North American trucking sector, we uncovered evidence 
showing that within the region and for this type of movement, trucking was not perfectly competitive 
consistently over both time and space. 
CONCLUSION
This research examined the medium- to long-haul agricultural trucking sector serving West-Central 
Alberta and East-Central Saskatchewan. Considering some persistent anecdotal evidence about the 
trucking market in the region, our objective was to evaluate the level and scope of competition 
within this particular trucking sector over the sample period.
Due to the nature of the agricultural commodity being moved, iso-rate contours for spring and 
harvest quarters were constructed using geographic information system software. We motivated and 
described a set of general suppositions regarding the shape of these iso-rates in relation to market 
structure. While we found that some portions of the maps appear to be indicative of non-competitive 
pricing behaviour in relation to our expectations, these effects were not found to last very long. 
While an uncompetitive market structure is not persistent within this trucking sector, we did identify 
certain times and locations where non-competitive behavior could play an unexpectedly important 
role.
To buttress the mapping analysis, a sub-sample of the rate data set was used to estimate a 
pairwise VAR system (and associated impulse response functions) across several key origins in the 
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region. Surprisingly, none of the impulses generated with this trucking data dissipated very quickly, 
a finding in contrast to what would be expected in a fully competitive market. However, the duration 
of the impulses was not long enough to conclude that the market as a whole was non-competitive. 
But on a practical level, our findings highlight concerns about the level of trucking competition that 
existed on at least one important transportation corridor in the region (Prince Albert-Lloydminster).
While the data used here in these analyses were extensive, additional variables would improve 
any future studies of spatial and temporal market power in transportation. These might include rates 
charged on outgoing loads, region-specific diesel prices, and trucking-specific wage rates. Extending 
the model to include outgoing freight rates would provide additional validity, as examining incoming 
loads alone cannot completely capture the nuances of this transportation market. In addition, diesel 
prices differ across provinces as a result of varying taxation rules and supply issues. Using province-
specific rates would allow the exercise to better account for such subtle differences, while the 
same could be said for the use of trucking-specific wage rates. Finally, while not pursued in this 
preliminary analysis, it would be instructive to estimate a larger VAR system that accommodates all 
identified origins simultaneously. As noted above, pairwise modeling restricts the possible sources 
of variation within the model, and could result in omitted variable bias as a consequence. Running 
all locations simultaneously would remove this bias, and would give a much better idea of how rates 
propagate throughout the study region and not just in selected pairings.
In suggesting ways to improve the current study, consider the quote from Norton (1971): “is 
there any complex industry about which too much can be known?” (p.453). The grain trucking 
industry in this region certainly seems to fall into this category and is worthy of continued analysis. 
Appendix A: Detail Map of the Region (Including Lloydminster, Hwy 16 and Key Origins)
103
JTRF Volume 52 No. 3, Fall 2013
Appendix B: Short-haul Trucking Price Index 
2000-2001 Crop Year 2001-2002 Crop Year
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
100.0 102.5 102.5 102.5 102.5 102.5 102.5 100.0
2002-2003 Crop Year 2003-2004 Crop Year
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2004-2005 Crop Year 2005-2006 Crop Year
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
100.0 100.0 108.8 111.3 114.7
Source: Quorum Corp. 2002
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Appendix C: Full Data Set - Location Summary by Year
% of Observations in Most Popular 
Origins
Year Top 6 Top 12 Top 21 Total Observations
2006 59.6% 69.7% 77.2% 1,549
2005 49.2% 74.1% 85.7% 2,609
2004 46.0% 57.1% 66.4% 1,202
2003 51.3% 60.6% 67.5% 1,356
2002 29.9% 40.8% 52.5% 777








Unity 164 452 Unity 164 499
Hamlin 151 134 Morinville 281 288
Dundurn 318 126 Wetaskiwin 266 143
Wetaskiwin 266 110 Allan 337 143
Allan 337 74 Hamlin 151 141
Saskatoon 277 36 North Battleford 140 73
Biggar 230 27 Biggar 230 67
Asquith 287 25 Perdue 260 61
Eston 301 24 Westlock 332 52
Ferintosh 262 24 Leask 302 47
Radisson 210 24 Prince Albert 348 47
Albertville 381 23 Quill Lake 451 43
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Unity 164 311 Unity 164 302
Prince Albert 348 72 Killam 185 152
Allan 337 55 Wetaskiwin 266 120
Wetaskiwin 266 50 Edmonton 249 42
Provost 124 37 Saskatoon 277 40
Leask 302 31 Allan 337 40
Biggar 230 28 Ferintosh 262 37
Bawlf 237 27 Provost 124 20
Borden 223 23 Sedgewick 193 20
Cutknife 119 22 Arlee 234 18
Watrous 393 20 Naicam 462 17








Hamlin 151 54 Westlock 332 133
Unity 164 47 Provost 124 123
Saskatoon 277 39 Vermillion 58 82
Allan 337 31 Viking 199 80
Wetaskiwin 266 31 Saskatoon 277 79
Balcarres 607 30 Wilkie 191 66
Thorhild 271 17 Edgerton 87 60
Indian Head 602 16 Olds 462 60
Edam 145 15 Hamlin 151 58
Cutknife 119 13 Wetaskiwin 266 58
Kelvington 556 12 Milden 326 48
Sheho 537 12 Biggar 230 42
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Appendix D: Selected Iso-rate Maps
Note - North is up, scales are approximately 130-140 miles/inch, depending on the map. 
Lloydminster is the small white triangle located just to the left and above the center of each map. 
Highway 16 is the gray line passing diagonally from northern Alberta to the southeastern portion 
of Saskatchewan, through Lloydminster. Rate #1 is the innermost contour on each map (centered 
around Lloydminster), while successive rates lie outside of the prior rate. Units for the rate bounds 
are measured in C$ per metric tonne.






















































Figure 4: Spring, 2003
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Figure 6: Harvest, 2004
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Appendix E: Selected Pairwise (by origin) VAR Estimates
Dependent variables are the applicable trucking rates, lagged variables as indicated. Die is the diesel 
fuel price index, wage is the wage rate and the seasonal dummies are labeled as such (Fall excluded). 
AIC diagnostics are also listed for each model. ** denotes significance at the 95% level, while * 
denotes significance at the 90% level, t-statistics are in square brackets. 
Model 1 Model 2
Weta Big Weta Ham
Variables
C 0.011416 0.027295* 0.021349 0.008001
[ 0.63758] [ 2.03295] [ 1.15729] [ 0.68378]
Weta (t-1) -0.2818 0.302242** -0.5469** -0.47383**
[-1.66711] [ 2.38449] [-2.92279] [-3.99246]
Weta (t-2) -0.14174 -0.5646**
[-0.74377] [-4.67118]
Big (t-1) 0.092033 -0.4648**
[ 0.51969] [-3.50023]
Big (t-2)
Ham (t-1) 0.418152** -0.44624**
[ 2.31535] [-3.89561]




Die (t-1) -0.08691 -0.12629 -0.00922 0.76803**




Wage (t-1) -0.21372 -0.1756 0.359127 0.424248*
[-0.50868] [-0.55736] [ 0.95056] [ 1.77045]
Wage (t-2)
spring -0.00134 -0.00988 -0.01131 -0.01805
[-0.06543] [-0.64467] [-0.52325] [-1.31652]
summer -0.00058 -0.03924** -0.01409 -0.00854
[-0.02626] [-2.37984] [-0.60835] [-0.58103]
winter -0.02599 -0.02292 -0.02806 0.012882
[-1.09579] [-1.28889] [-1.14901] [ 0.83179]
AIC -2.92118 -3.49693 -2.85007 -3.76064
AIC (model) -6.46737 -6.71738
R-squared 0.202372 0.500266 0.331968 0.672475
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Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Big All Big Ham Big PA
Variables
C 0.039343** 0.002016 0.035471* -0.0091 0.086268** 0.052365**
[ 2.18314] [ 0.11592] [ 1.78340] [-0.48060] [ 5.82290] [ 3.15934]
Big (t-1) -0.36673* -0.0472 -0.49595** -0.2198 -0.09971 0.249132
[-2.01307] [-0.26850] [-3.00810] [-1.40053] [-0.68496] [ 1.52972]
Big (t-2) -0.34816** 0.159065
[-2.83496] [ 1.15774]
All (t-1) 0.071619 -0.38828**
[ 0.37826] [-2.12501]
All (t-2)
Ham (t-1) 0.354416* -0.25205
[ 1.97186] [-1.47316]
Ham (t-2)
PA (t-1) -0.00965 -0.77679**
[-0.05548] [-3.99208]
PA (t-2) 0.361588* -0.26117
[ 2.02237] [-1.30564]
Die -0.16224 0.178884 -0.33828* 0.046822
[-0.65322] [ 0.74630] [-2.02566] [ 0.29454]
Die (t-1) -0.06198 -0.12978 0.075655 0.679063**
[-0.26043] [-0.56504] [ 0.44709] [ 4.21574]
Die (t-2) -0.09813 -0.05952 0.040745 0.236305*
[-0.49092] [-0.31281] [ 0.33935] [ 1.75919]
Wage -0.07051 -0.01674 0.323802 -0.14842
[-0.20401] [-0.05018] [ 0.89037] [-0.42872]
Wage (t-1) 0.080692 -0.72753* 0.598368 -0.45576
[ 0.21868] [-2.04301] [ 1.62842] [-1.30299]
Wage (t-2) 0.34819 -0.67585** 0.026342 -0.07897
[ 1.09704] [-2.23697] [ 0.12818] [-0.34347]
Spring -0.00847 0.02628 -0.01988 -0.00174 -0.06467** -0.05615**
[-0.40378] [ 1.29752] [-0.92542] [-0.08507] [-3.59318] [-2.78868]
Summer -0.05927** 0.002238 -0.05777** 0.020294 -0.10597** -0.04447**
[-2.73876] [ 0.10715] [-2.37425] [ 0.87623] [-6.44397] [-2.41696]
Winter -0.03484 0.009009 -0.02225 0.018691 -0.08447** -0.06027**
[-1.41986] [ 0.38051] [-0.94831] [ 0.83681] [-4.50481] [-2.87291]
AIC -3.0395 -3.11064 -3.07504 -3.17361 -3.96743 -3.74299
AIC (model) -6.43553 -6.2507 -7.71961
R-squared 0.477737 0.421642 0.496382 0.546429 0.805102 0.604294
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Model 6 Model 7
Big Uni Ham PA
Variables
C 0.038609 0.065098** 0.013568 0.024827*
[ 1.26687] [ 2.74145] [ 0.64226] [ 1.92250]
Big (t-1) -0.33709 -0.09012
[-1.08227] [-0.37136]
Big (t-2)
Uni (t-1) -0.05293 -0.65005**
[-0.21308] [-3.35855]
Uni (t-2)
Ham (t-1) -0.28783 -0.25737
[-1.03267] [-1.51045]
Ham (t-2)
PA (t-1) -0.27231 -0.45814**
[-0.93420] [-2.57106]
PA (t-2)
Die -0.33664 -0.76043** 0.340703 0.076999
[-1.07823] [-3.12589] [ 1.62820] [ 0.60194]
Die (t-1) 0.118687 0.344192**
[ 0.52058] [ 2.46956]
Die (t-2) 0.135537 0.083268
[ 0.71868] [ 0.72226]
Wage -0.10541 0.322864 0.086144 -0.26252
[-0.21549] [ 0.84705] [ 0.22929] [-1.14302]
Wage (t-1) -0.34113 -0.10926
[-0.82375] [-0.43159]
Wage (t-1) -0.18717 -0.47951**
[-0.51181] [-2.14483]
Spring -0.01549 -0.05851** -0.02148 -0.02192
[-0.44887] [-2.17633] [-0.88620] [-1.47937]
Summer -0.04164 -0.03167 -0.01492 -0.02601*
[-1.19567] [-1.16702] [-0.64273] [-1.83307]
Winter -0.02231 -0.06468** -0.0089 -0.01643
[-0.62304] [-2.31844] [-0.35338] [-1.06693]
AIC -2.82659 -3.32565 -3.10805 -4.09235
AIC (model) -6.41407 -7.37511
R-squared 0.324896 0.605745 0.285887 0.619669
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Appendix F: Pairwise Impulse Response Graphs for Each VAR Model 
Note: The y-axis has no units and represents only relative magnitude of the price shock. The x-axis 
is in months. Relative location to Lloydminister is indicated by (W)est or (E)ast. 
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Endnotes
1. The material discussed in this section was developed by the authors, motivated by the work of 
Newell (1980).
2. Despite considerable search efforts, we have been unable to find prior research examining rate 
contours in this context. Nor have we yet found or developed a suitable statistical test of “shape” 
for the contours (i.e., “smooth” vs. “irregular”). Work on this issue is on-going. 
3. One co-author (Laing) had personal experience in the industry, indicating that this was common 
practice. 
4. As a data mining exercise that ultimately generates trucking rate impulse responses in order 
to assess market power and market integration, our brief discussion about the estimated VAR 
coefficients is offered merely for exposition. By comparison, DeVany and Walls (1996, 1999) 
did not discuss properties of their VAR coefficient estimates, although they were listed in each 
paper. Finally we note that each of the specified VAR models converged with either one or two 
variable lags, while the reported Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was used to assess relative 
model stability (Murray 2006). 
5. Kim and McMillin (2003) observed that a large number of insignificant coefficients are often 
generated from this type of analysis. 
6. As alluded to in a previous footnote, one of the co-authors of the paper (Laing) was directly 
involved in this process while the data were collected. 
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